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In a randomized ￿eld experiment where ￿rst year university students could
earn ￿nancial rewards for passing all ￿rst year requirements within one year
we ￿nd small and non-signi￿cant average e￿ects of ￿nancial incentives on
the pass rate and the numbers of collected credit points. There is however
evidence that high ability students collect signi￿cantly more credit points
when assigned to (larger) reward groups. Low ability students collect less
credit points when assigned to larger reward groups. After three years these
e￿ects have increased, suggesting dynamic spillovers. The small average ef-
fect in the population is therefore the sum of a positive e￿ect for high ability
students and a (partly) o￿-setting negative e￿ect for low ability students. A
negative e￿ect of ￿nancial incentives for less able individuals is in line with
research from psychology and recent economic laboratory experiments which
shows that external rewards may be detrimental for intrinsic motivation.
Keywords: ￿nancial incentives, student achievement, randomized social ex-
periment, heterogeneous treatment e￿ects, higher education policy
JEL Codes: I21, I22, J241 Introduction
Recently, there is increased interest in the e￿ectiveness of ￿nancial incentives
for students to increase their achievement (e.g. Angrist et al. 2002; Angrist
and Lavy 2002, 2005; Dearden et al. 2002; Kremer et al. 2004). This interest
is in part fed by the impression that spending money to increase education
inputs (e.g. computers, class size) is often a relatively ine￿ective way to
improve student outcomes (Hanushek 1986, 1996; Hoxby 2000). Although
standard economic theory predicts a positive relation between ￿nancial in-
centives and e￿ort, there is little empirical evidence that shows that ￿nancial
incentives are indeed an e￿ective way to improve student outcomes.
While there is evidence that ￿nancial incentives work in many contexts,
there is also a large literature in psychology and experimental economics
that draws attention to potential adverse e￿ects of incentives. Camerer and
Hogarth (1999) review 74 studies where subjects were paid zero, small or
large ￿nancial rewards for a large variety of tasks. The e￿ects of incentives
on performance in these studies are mixed and complicated. Camerer and
Hogarth point to two important results: the importance of intrinsic motiva-
tion, and the match of what they refer to as ￿production￿ (the characteristics
of the task at hand) and ￿capital￿ (the cognitive skills of the subjects). They
conclude that (i) capital variables such as educational background, general
intelligence and experience may interact with incentives, (ii) poorly capi-
talized individuals may perform worse, and (iii) interaction e￿ects between
capital and production may result in so-called ￿￿oor e￿ects￿ (when tasks are
feasible for many) or ￿ceiling e￿ects￿ (when task are feasible for few).
The e￿ect of ￿nancial incentives in general, and the e￿ect of ￿nancial in-
centives in education in particular is therefore an empirical question. There is
relatively little experimental evidence on the e￿ectiveness of ￿nancial incen-
tives in the context of educational production, and on how students respond
to ￿nancial rewards. Angrist and Lavy (2005) analyze the e￿ects of ￿nancial
rewards on students’ achievement in an experimental setting. They evalu-
ate the e￿ectiveness of ￿nancial incentives that reward secondary education
matriculation in Israel. They ￿nd that the intervention led to a substantial
increase in matriculation rates among girls. Kremer et al. (2004) analyze
the e￿ects of ￿nancial rewards on achievement for primary school girls in
rural Kenya by means of a randomized experiment. The experiment was
1conducted in two districts in western Kenya and shows large positive e￿ects
on both achievement and school attendance in one of these districts. There
is also evidence for substantial externalities. Although only girls were eli-
gible it is found that boys (who were ineligible), and girls with low initial
achievement (who were unlikely to earn a reward) also experienced higher
test scores and school attendance.1
This paper studies the e￿ect of ￿nancial incentives on achievement and
e￿ort by means of a randomized ￿eld experiment among ￿rst year undergrad-
uate students in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam who
started in the academic year 2001/2002. The experimental design was such
that freshmen were randomly assigned to three groups. Students assigned
to the large reward group could earn a bonus of NLG 1,500 (e681) on com-
pletion of all ￿rst year requirements by the start of the next academic year.
Students assigned to the small reward group could earn a NLG 500 (e227)
bonus for this achievement. Students who were assigned to the control group
could not earn a reward. The design with both a small and a large reward
allows us to separate the e￿ect of receiving a ￿nancial reward from the e￿ect
of the size of the reward. This distinction is potentially important because
it has been found that rewards may a￿ect performance in a non-monotonic
fashion. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found that where substantial rewards
improve performance, small rewards may actually deteriorate achievement.
To brie￿y summarize our results, for the full sample we ￿nd a small and
non-signi￿cant positive e￿ect of the large reward on achievement, both mea-
sured by pass rates and numbers of collected credit points. We ￿nd evidence
for the importance of the e￿ects highlighted by Camerer and Hogarth. In
particular, high ability students (those with more ￿capital￿) have higher pass
rates and collect signi￿cantly more credit points when assigned to (larger)
reward groups. Low ability students (those with less ￿capital￿) on the other
hand appear to achieve less when assigned to the large reward group. While
1Two other programs worth mentioning, although they do not have an experimental
setup, are the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) in the United Kingdom and
Columbia’s PACES program. Both interventions provide ￿nancial incentives for achieve-
ment. The EMA gives low-income families a payment for enrollment and achievement.
Assignment to treatment is, however, not random. Dearden et al. (2001, 2002) describe the
evaluation of this program. PACES is a program in which more than 125,000 Colombian
pupils received vouchers which covered about half of the cost of private secondary school.
Vouchers were only renewed for pupils who maintained satisfactory academic performance
(Angrist et al., 2002).
2at the end of the ￿rst year these e￿ects are only signi￿cant for the high
ability group, after three years the sizes of the e￿ects has increased and are
statistically signi￿cant for both low and high ability students. The average
treatment e￿ect is therefore small and insigni￿cant not because all students
are unresponsive to ￿nancial incentives, but because it is an average of a
positive e￿ect at the upper end of the ability distribution and a negative
e￿ect at the lower end.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
relevant background information about the Dutch system of higher education
and of the economics and business program at the University of Amsterdam.
Section 3 explains the design of the ￿eld experiment and describes the data.
Section 4 presents and discusses the results for the whole population. Section
5 investigates the behavioral heterogeneity mentioned in the previous para-
graph, and discusses the interpretation of these ￿ndings. Section 6 discusses
potential threats to the validity of the experiment such as substitution bias,
manipulation by teachers, and externalities, and concludes that these are
unlikely to a￿ect our conclusions. Section 7 summarizes and discusses our
￿ndings.
2 Background
University education in the Netherlands is accessible to all students with
a quali￿cation from the pre-university track in secondary education. This
secondary education quali￿cation can only be obtained by passing a uniform
nationwide exam. The relevant secondary education exit requirements are set
such that they are considered to be su￿cient university entry requirements,
and therefore all students starting a university education in economics or
business are supposed to be capable of actually graduating (given that they
exert su￿cient e￿ort). In the academic year 2001/2002 there were 34,200 ￿rst
year students at Dutch universities, which is about 17 percent of the relevant
birth cohort. Universities are not permitted to select students; everyone
who applies with a valid entry quali￿cation has to be admitted.2 In the
Netherlands selection therefore takes place at the exit of secondary education
as opposed to at the entry of higher education.
2For a few studies students are admitted on the basis of a lottery when the number of
applicants exceeds the number of available places. This is not the case for the economics
and business studies.
3Currently, six Dutch universities o￿er an undergraduate program in eco-
nomics and business. While there are small di￿erences between the programs
o￿ered by these universities, they are considered to be close substitutes. Not
only do they attract students from the same pool of secondary school grad-
uates, but they prepare their students for the same labor market, although
people tend to stay in their region of origin. Oosterbeek et al. (1992) com-
pare the labor market outcomes of graduates from the di￿erent economics
and business departments in the Netherlands and ￿nd that selection cor-
rected wage di￿erentials are modest.
University students in the Netherlands are all charged the same tuition
fee (NLG 2,930 (e1,300) in the academic year 2001/2002). The tuition fee
is set by the government and does not vary by ￿eld of study or by university.
There is also a ￿nancial aid system which pays all university students up to
NLG 1,424 (e646) per month. The ￿nancial aid scheme consists of three
components (roughly equal at the maximum amount) that students are en-
titled to for a maximum of four years. The ￿rst component is a basic grant,
the second an additional grant that decreases with parental income, and the
third (optional) component is a loan.
The loan component of the ￿nancial aid scheme is not very popular
among Dutch students. Students typically use the basic grant and the addi-
tional grant, but of the total amount available for loans less than 20 percent
is requested. This type of dept aversion is not only observed in the Nether-
lands, see for example Field (2006) who ￿nds evidence for dept aversion of
law students at New York University. Instead of taking up the loan many
university students combine studying with some hours of paid work. In our
sample around 80 percent of the students work, and they work on average
around 12 hours per week (details concerning data collection are provided
later).
The undergraduate program in economics and business at the University
of Amsterdam is a 4 year program. In the ￿rst academic year, which runs
from September until August, all students in economics and business follow
exactly the same program of 14 compulsory courses. The ￿rst year program
was divided into three terms of 14 weeks each in the year that the experiment
was conducted. It is important to note that, since the program is ￿xed,
students cannot substitute easy for di￿cult courses. Every term ended with
exams shortly after the courses ￿nished and the re-take exams are organized
4in March/April and the last week of August. The ￿rst academic year thus
consisted of 42 study weeks, which are allotted to di￿erent courses in the form
of 60 credit points.3 It is only after the ￿rst term of their second academic
year that students choose di￿erent packages of courses to specialize either in
economics or in business.
3 Experimental design and data
3.1 Design
The ￿rst year pass rate among students in economics and business at the
University of Amsterdam is typically in the vicinity of 20 percent. Such
low pass rates are not uncommon in continental European countries (e.g.
Garibaldi et al., 2005) and can be attributed to an institutional arrange-
ment in which universities are publicly funded and where tuition fees are
low or non-existing. As a consequence, students are not confronted with
appropriate prices and spend more time in the system than the nominal
duration of their studies.
For society, delay imposes a cost in the form of extra expenditures on
education and the foregone productivity of the students. The Department
of Economics at the University of Amsterdam has an incentive to increase
the pass rate since funding depends partly on the number of credits points
awarded each year. There are also other reasons to address the delay of
students: teaching becomes more di￿cult because not all students are on
schedule, the failing and re-taking of exams also implies more crowded class-
rooms and more grading. Moreover, once a year a ranking of university
departments in each ￿eld is published which is aimed at secondary educa-
tion students who are in the process of choosing their university education.
The ￿rst year pass rate is one of the inputs of this ranking.
At the beginning of the third trimester in the academic year 1999/2000
the low pass rate among ￿rst year students spurred the dean of the economics
department to promise all undergraduate econometrics freshmen a reward of
NLG 1,000 (e454) upon ful￿lling all ￿rst year requirements before the start
of the next academic year. In the Netherlands, econometrics is a separate
undergraduate education from economics and business, and attracts students
3Table A1 in the appendix gives an overview of the ￿rst year courses and the number
of credit points assigned to each course.
5from the upper part of the ability distribution. In the year that this reward
was in place the pass rate was 0.50 compared to 0.28 in the previous year
(cf. Hilkhuysen 2000).
It is di￿cult to establish a causal relation between the ￿nancial incentive
and the increased pass rate given the non-experimental nature of the inter-
vention. While the 0.22 increase in the pass rate may be the causal e￿ect
of the reward, this need not be the case. Plausible alternative explanations
for the increased pass rate are a higher quality of the student cohort, less
demanding courses, and less strict grading of exams. Nevertheless the results
suggest that a ￿nancial incentive may be a very e￿ective policy intervention.
In order to investigate this question using a ￿eld experiment, we ran-
domized ￿rst year economics and business students in the academic year
2001/2002 in three groups; a control group, a large reward group and a
small reward group. The reward sizes of the large and small reward groups
are NLG 1,500 (e681) and NLG 500 (e227). Given the substantial increase
in the pass rate attributed to the NLG 1,000 (e454) reward for economet-
rics students, we judged that the rewards in the present experiment were
su￿ciently large to increase pass rates. Moreover, calculations made at the
start of the study showed that the increase in passing rates that is necessary
to obtain some reasonable statistical power is well within the 0.22-increase
in passing rates that was found in the earlier study among econometrics
students.
An important feature of our design is the distinction between a large
and a small reward. This potentially allows us to distinguish between the
e￿ect of being treated as such, and the e￿ect of the size of the reward (and
investigate the presence of potential disincentive e￿ects of small ￿nancial
rewards).
To ensure that all students were treated identically, participation in the
experiment was only open to students who (i) followed the full-time program,
(ii) did not claim more than 1 credit point dispensation,4 and (iii) did not
start the economics and business program in a previous year. The total
number of eligible students equals 254.
Participation in the experiment was on a voluntary basis. On October 1,
2001, almost one month after classes started, we sent all ￿rst year students
4Students can receive 1 credit point dispensation for part of the ￿nancial accounting
course if they followed a speci￿c course during secondary education.
6a letter inviting them to participate in the experiment. This was the earliest
possible date given the availability of addresses from the student adminis-
tration. The letter explained the purpose of the experiment and informed
students that participants would be randomly assigned to three equally sized
groups with equal odds for all students. Furthermore the letter explained
that participation implied that the student granted the researchers permis-
sion to link information from the experiment to information from the student
records about their achievements. Students received a ￿xed payment of NLG
50 (e22.69) for returning a completed participation form including a small
questionnaire. After a reminder and a telephone round, 249 eligible students
participated in the experiment which is 98% of all eligible students. Three
students could not be reached and 2 students explicitly rejected participa-
tion.
In the random assignment 83 students were assigned to the large reward
group, 84 students to the small reward group, and 82 students to the control
group. On November 29, letters were sent informing participants about their
assignment status. The ￿rst exam of the ￿rst term was on November 28, the
others in December. The exams of the second and third term took place
next calendar year in March/April and June/July respectively. The re-take
exams were held in August.
3.2 Data from questionnaire
The short questionnaire, ￿lled out at the moment of registration for partic-
ipation, collected information on respondents’ mathematics grades in sec-
ondary school and their parents’ education.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the background characteristics
of the complete sample and for the three di￿erent reward groups. Parental
education is reported in years. Dutch pre-university secondary education
o￿ers two programs in mathematics: mathematics A and mathematics B.
Mathematics A is considerably less advanced than mathematics B. Students
are allowed to take exams in both programs, but it is not compulsory to do
mathematics A in order to do mathematics B. In practice the better students
choose mathematics B. Apart from the average grades on the math exams,
Table 1 also reports the shares of students who did not take the exam for
mathematics A, or mathematics B. Exams are graded on a scale from 1
(lowest) to 10 (highest). The random assignment was done by stratifying
7the participants on the basis of their mathematics results and their parents’
education. This precludes that the random assignment procedure acciden-
tally results in groups that di￿er in these observed characteristics. Table 1
shows that the randomization balances the characteristics well between the
treatment and control groups. We will control for these background variables
in our analysis.
The pre-assignment questionnaire also asked participants their subjective
probability of ful￿lling the requirement of passing all exams within the ￿rst
academic year if they would be assigned to the control group, the small
reward group and the large reward group respectively. This was done to get
some indication of the anticipated e￿ect of the rewards before the experiment
actually took place. The average expected probabilities are reported in the
bottom part of Table 1. Without a reward the expected pass rate equals
0.55. Given that the actual pass rates in previous years were around 0.20,
students seem overly optimistic at the beginning of their study. If students
would be entitled to the small reward the expected pass rate increases to
0.63, and it increases to 0.71 for the large reward. This implies that ex-ante
the students themselves expected quite sizable e￿ects from the rewards. No
di￿erences are observed across groups. Conditional on ability, proxied by
the available math grades, the self-assessed pass probability for the control
treatment could be interpreted as a measure of intrinsic motivation. We will
add this as a control variable in the analyses.
After the experiment ended a second questionnaire was sent to all par-
ticipants. Upon completion, students received a payment of e25. In total
234 participants responded, which is 94% of all participants. This post-
experiment questionnaire asked questions concerning the time students spent
on their studies during the past year, their work activities during the past
study year, and possible supplementary rewards o￿ered by third parties. We
discuss the results and ￿ndings based on these data in sections 4 to 6.
4 Results
4.1 Achievement
We report the impact estimates on a number of outcome variables. First we
look at the ￿rst year pass rate since the bonus was tied to collecting all 60





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9collected in the ￿rst year. As mentioned above, we also look at the longer
term impacts of the ￿nancial rewards, namely the number of credit points
achieved after 3 years, and whether the student dropped out by this time
(i.e. is no longer registered as an economics undergraduate student).
For each outcome variable we ￿rst report the raw means and standard
errors for every treatment (and control) group. We estimate regressions of
the form
yi = α + δLDL
i + δHDH
i + x0
iβ + εi (1)
where DL
i equals one if student i was in the small reward group, and zero oth-
erwise, DH
i is a corresponding indicator variable for the large reward group.
Finally, we report estimates with and without a set of control variables xi.
We include these to correct for remaining di￿erences between the di￿erent
treatment groups and to reduce the residual variation in order to improve
the precision of our e￿ect estimates.
Column (1) in Table 2 shows the average pass rates for the di￿erent
groups. The pass rate increases monotonically with the size of the reward
from 0.195 in the control group to 0.241 in the large reward group. The
second column shows the results from the regression without controls. The
coe￿cients are the di￿erence with respect to the control group which is the
reference category, and p-values from standard t-tests are reported in the
lower part of Table 2. Although the pass rate increases with reward size
the di￿erences are not statistically signi￿cant. It can also not be rejected
that the size of the e￿ect is the same for the small and the large reward.
Furthermore, the pooled estimate (not reported) is also insigni￿cant with a
p-value of 0.368. Column (3) adds controls to the regression in the second
column. The point estimates increase somewhat and the standard errors are
reduced, the ￿nal estimate of the e￿ect of the large reward 0.055 and 0.033
for the small reward. Again, these di￿erences are not statistically signi￿cant.
Columns (4)-(6) report the results for the number of credit points by the
end of the ￿rst year. Students in the control group earn on average 33.2
credit points. This number is lower in the treatment groups where students
collect on average less credit points. After adding regressors the negative
impact estimates attenuate somewhat and standard errors decrease, but the
pattern remains the same.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12end of the third year for every treatment group. The picture here is roughly
the same as after one year, small positive or negative di￿erences between
the treatment groups and the control groups, none of which is remotely
signi￿cant. Finally, columns (10)-(12) report the fraction of students that
dropped out of economics after three years. Students in the treatment groups
are more likely to be still enrolled after three years than the students in
the control group. Again these e￿ects are not statistically signi￿cant at
conventional levels.
Interestingly the point estimates on the number of credit points, both
after 1 year and after 3 years, and the drop-out rate are not monotonic.
Students in the small reward group perform worse than students in the con-
trol group, and students in the large reward group perform uniformly better
than students in the small reward group. This is a similar pattern as in
the study by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) who ￿nd that small rewards can
have disincentive e￿ects. The fact that the average pass rates do increase
monotonically with the reward size suggests that the e￿ects of the rewards
are not uniform across the credit point distribution and possibly di￿erent for
di￿erent subjects.
To investigate this further, Figure 1 shows the cumulative distributions of
the number of achieved credit points for each of the three reward groups after
one year, and after three years. Although the three distributions are very
similar after 1 year, students in the treatment groups are more often at the
bottom and at the top of the credit point distribution. This explains why we
observe a monotonic e￿ect of reward size on the pass rate together with a non-
monotonic (negative) impact on the number of credits points. The p-value
of a chi-square test for equality of the distributions equals 0.97, indicating
that by the end of the ￿rst year there are no signi￿cant di￿erences between
the distributions of credit points of the di￿erent groups. For the number of
credit points collected after 3 years the cumulative density function of the
treatment groups are very similar.
That students in the reward groups perform better at the top of the
credit point distribution can be explained by the fact that the reward was
explicitly tied to the pass rate. This is also consistent with the fact that
the e￿ect at the top is only observed in the ￿rst year, when the reward
was in place, and not after three years. It is more di￿cult to explain the
poorer performance of students in the small and large reward groups at the
13bottom of the distribution. One explanation could be an interaction e￿ect
between the ￿nancial reward and student ability (Camerer and Hogarth,
1999). If there are ceiling e￿ects, then low ability students might perceive
the threshold of the 60 credits points necessary to collect the reward as
infeasible. The ￿nancial reward would not have an incentive e￿ect for this
group. If in addition the external reward displaces intrinsic motivation of
students (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997), then ￿nancial incentives would
deteriorate the performance of low ability students. High ability students on
the other hand, might judge the requirement of the reward as feasible and
increase their e￿ort. We explore this further in section 5.
4.2 E￿ort and time allocation
The e￿ect of rewards on achievement is a reduced form e￿ect. It does not
disentangle the e￿ects of rewards on e￿ort and subsequently of e￿ort on
achievement. Even if e￿ects on achievement are zero or small, we cannot
rule out that students increased their e￿ort. We collected information about
students’ e￿ort levels to examine whether the rewards had an impact on
e￿ort. The post-experiment questionnaire included the following questions:
• ￿How many hours per week did you on average spend on your study
in economics and business during each of the three trimesters of the
past academic year (2001/2002)? (We want to know the total average
time spent on your study, this means including following and preparing
lectures and courses and preparing exams.)￿
• ￿How many hours did you spend in total on preparing re-take exams
held in August? (Here we want to know the total number of hours,
not the average per week.)￿
Information on study time is provided in the ￿rst block of Table 3.
Average study time in the control group is around 23.6 hours per week
during the ￿rst trimester and decreases to about 19 during the second trimester
and 17 during the third trimester. Students in the control group spend on
average 29.5 hours to prepare their re-take exams during the summer. Quite
a few students report that they do not spend time at all on their study,
which in￿uences the averages for the second and third trimesters and for











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15summer period, also students who did no re-take exams.5 Students in the
treatment groups tend to spend slightly less time on their study, but average
time spent on the study is very similar across groups. Di￿erences across
groups are neither substantial nor statistically signi￿cant.
The questions about study time measure actual e￿ort only imperfectly.
The responses are subjective and retrospective, and only measure time input
and not the e￿ective input per hour. While biases due to this may cancel out
in across group comparisons, it is desirable to have additional information
about study e￿ort. The questionnaire therefore also included items concern-
ing time spent on paid work, whether respondents joined a fraternity and
whether they lived with their parents. Results are also reported in Table 3.
Columns (6)-(8) show that 76 percent of the students in the control group
combine studying with work, and those who work spend around 12.5 hours
per week on this activity while earning on average e7.69 per hour. Here, we
see no di￿erences between the reward and control groups with the exception
that students in the large reward group tend to earn somewhat lower wage
rates than students in the other two groups. Finally, the last two columns
of Table 3 reveal that the rewards did not prevent students from joining a
fraternity or from moving out of their parents’ house.6
To summarize, we cannot reject equality in reported study time and
other time allocation variables between the treatment and control groups.
This result is consistent with the ￿rst ￿nding that rewards do not a￿ect
achievement by a signi￿cant margin, although it should be noted that it
is not possible to rule out di￿erences given the precision of the reported
estimates in Table 3.7
5In the ￿rst trimester 3 respondents report zero study e￿ort, in the second trimester
this equals 33 and in the third trimester 39; 83 students spent zero hours on preparing
for the August re-take exams, of which 22 students did not have to do any re-take exams.
For the sample reporting positive numbers, the distribution of study time is bell-shaped.
6Adding controls to the analysis, as reported in table A2, does not change the di￿erences
between the control and reward groups.
7If the rewards would have increased students’ study time then we would have been
able to estimate the causal e￿ect of study time on achievement. Since the rewards do not
change study time we cannot estimate such an e￿ect. Regressing the pass rate on study
time we ￿nd that one hour study time extra per week is associated with a one percentage
point higher pass rate. Adding controls for ability, social background and the subjective
pass rate does not change the size of this correlation.
165 Ability interactions
In the previous section we found indications for both non-monotonic e￿ects
of the size of the rewards, and di￿erential impacts of the reward across the
outcome distribution. There are good reasons to expect that some students
will be more responsive to a reward than others because of heterogeneity in
the marginal cost of e￿ort or heterogeneity in returns to e￿ort. Given the
performance threshold attached to the reward, high ability students have to
bridge a smaller gap than low ability students because the former collect more
credit points in the ￿rst place. In addition, high ability students probably
earn more extra credit points than low ability students for a given increase
of e￿ort. Consequently, high ability students are more likely to respond to
the rewards than low ability students.
In this section we explore this further by looking at the interaction be-
tween the rewards and student ability. To do so, we construct an ability
index based on students’ high school math grades (which can range from 1
(worst) to 10 (best)). Students could matriculate in two types of math. As
noted in section 3.2 above, type B math is considerably more advanced than
type A math. The better students enroll in math B and often (40 percent)
take math A on the side. Of those who do, the math A grade is on average
1.5 points higher than the math B grade. We therefore take ability as the
maximum of the student’s math B grade and math A grade minus 1.5. 8 The
distribution of the ability index has a (slightly skewed) bell shape (ranging
from 2 to 9 with mean 5.4 and standard deviation 1.4).
As a robustness check we also performed the analysis in this section using
an alternative ability index, namely the grade of the ￿rst (math) exam of
the ￿rst term (which was held before the students learned their treatment
status, but after the announcement of the experiment). The drawback of
this variable is that 20 percent of the students did not make this exam
on the ￿rst occasion. For this reason we present the results based on the
high school math grades in this section. The results of the analysis based
on the subsample of students with a non-missing grade on the ￿rst exam
are however very similar to the ones presented here and therefore provide
additional support for our ￿ndings.
8We also performed a principal component analysis of the math grades and the math
indicator variables. Using the ￿rst two scores from this analysis does not change the
conclusions.
17Before presenting our estimation results, we ￿rst look at the raw data.
To stratify by ability we split the sample in two: students of high (above
average) ability and students of low (below average) ability. A student is
assigned to the high ability group if he scores at least six on the index which
implies at least a grade su￿cient to pass the math B exam (6), otherwise a
student is assigned to the low ability group. This results in 100 students in
the high ability group and 149 students in the low ability group.9
Figure 2 shows, strati￿ed by ability group, the cumulative distribution
functions of the number of credit points achieved after 1 and 3 years for the
three reward groups. The two top panels show the outcome distributions
for the high ability students, whereas the two bottom panels show them for
the low ability students. It is immediately apparent from the graph that for
the high ability students the outcome distribution for the high reward group
stochastically dominates the distributions of the other two groups. For the
low ability students we observe the opposite, here the distribution for the
large reward group is stochastically dominated by the outcome distribution
for the lower rewards groups. The large reward therefore seems to have a
positive incentive e￿ect at the top of the ability distribution, and a negative
e￿ect at the bottom of the ability distribution. The ordering of the distrib-
utions seems to be monotonic with reward size, with the order reversed at
the bottom of the ability distribution. This is especially apparent after 3
years.10
We estimated the following regression to estimate how the treatment
e￿ects vary with ability:
yi = α + δLDL
i + δA
LDL
i Ai + δHDH
i + δA
HDH
i Ai + γAi + x0
iβ + εi (2)
where Ai is our ability index. As above, DL
i is a treatment indicator for
the low reward group, and DH
i is a corresponding indicator variable for
the large reward group. Finally, xi is a set of control variables, and yi the
outcome variable. To illustrate the interpretation of the coe￿cients with this
9Splitting the sample exactly in two is not possible because of the discreteness of the
math grades.
10We also calculated two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests. For the
low ability group we ￿nd that with probability 0.165 the credit point distribution in 2004
is the same for the control group and the large reward group. For the high ability group
the p-value on the test is 0.146. These tests are of course conservative, and do not control












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20speci￿cation, δL gives the main (intercept) e￿ect of the small reward, and δA
L
traces the e￿ect of the small reward for di￿erent levels of ability (1 point on
a ten point scale). The e￿ect of a small reward for a student who scored a 10
(the highest possible score) on his high school math exam is then δL +10δA
L,
whereas the e￿ect for a low ability student who scored a 4 equals δL + 4δA
L.
Table 4 reports how the e￿ect estimates vary with ability. The ￿rst thing
to note is that, conditional on ability, there is now a monotonic relation
between the size of the reward and the impact estimate on all outcome
variables. For students with a higher ability level achievement improves
with reward size, whereas for students with a lower ability level achievement
deteriorates with the size of the reward. The small average e￿ects found
earlier are therefore an average of negative e￿ects at the bottom of the skill
distribution, and positive e￿ects at the top of the skill distribution. This not
only explains the modest e￿ects we found above, when negative and positive
e￿ects approximately cancel out, but is also the source of the non-monotonic
relationship between reward size and credit points observed in Table 2.
Table 5 reports impact estimates for students of average (mean) ability,
low ability (mean ability minus one standard deviation), and high ability
(plus one standard deviation), based on the regressions in Table 4. While
negligible for the average student, the point estimates are negative for low
ability students and positive for high ability students. This is observed for
both the small and the large reward, moreover, impact estimates increase
with reward size.
Column (1) shows the results for the ￿rst year pass rate. E￿ects are
negative at the lower end of the skill distribution and positive at the higher
end. This lends support for the interpretation forwarded above that there
is a binding participation constraint for low ability students. Although the
e￿ects are not signi￿cant, it is clear that if there are any e￿ects then these
are observed for the high ability students. Column (2) shows the impact
estimates on the number of credit points students achieved by the end of the
￿rst year. Here we see that high ability students in the large reward group
perform signi￿cantly better than high ability students in the control group.
Low ability students in the large reward group score less well than their
counterparts in the control group. This e￿ect is signi￿cant at a 5 percent
level.
Columns (3) and (4) report the long term e￿ects of the rewards. For
21Table 5: Achievement; Reward E￿ects by Ability
Achievement, Year 1 Achievement, Year 1-3
Pass rate Credit points Credit points Drop out
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Large Reward
Mean Ability - S.D. -0.046 -8.331 -27.301 0.127
(0.057) (3.869) (12.677) (0.107)
Mean Ability 0.048 -0.124 -0.149 -0.055
(0.059) (2.886) (8.736) (0.072)
Mean Ability + S.D. 0.142 8.082 27.004 -0.237
(0.100) (3.634) (11.963) (0.083)
B. Small Reward
Mean Ability - S.D. -0.066 -5.258 -18.242 0.008
(0.052) (4.025) (12.383) (0.106)
Mean Ability 0.012 -1.079 -2.688 -0.062
(0.055) (3.005) (8.844) (0.074)
Mean Ability + S.D. 0.089 3.100 12.866 -0.133
(0.096) (3.979) (12.582) (0.092)
Note: Based on regressions in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses.
low ability students the negative e￿ects of the rewards after one year have
been magni￿ed. After three years, low ability students assigned to the large
reward group do signi￿cantly worse than low ability students assigned to the
control group. This group also has a higher dropout rate (although this lacks
precision). For low ability students assigned to the small reward group the
e￿ects after three years are smaller (and insigni￿cant) but go in the same
direction. For the high ability students the e￿ects obtained after one year
have also increased after three years. High ability students assigned to the
large reward group collected more credit points than high ability students
assigned to the control group. They also have a lower dropout rate. Both
di￿erences are statistically signi￿cant. For high ability students assigned to
the small reward group e￿ects are smaller and lack precision, but go in the
same direction.
We thus ￿nd that there is signi￿cant heterogeneity in the behavioral re-
sponse to ￿nancial incentives. Low ability students perform worse, and high
ability students perform better. Conditional on ability these relationships
are monotonic over the range of the rewards that were o￿ered. It is possible
to interpret these results along the lines of Camerer and Hogarth (1999). If
￿nancial rewards have important displacement e￿ects on intrinsic motivation
this can explain a negative relationship between reward (size) and achieve-
ment, especially at the bottom of the skill distribution. The performance
22threshold tied to the reward, can also result in ceiling e￿ects at the bottom.
This will then result in zero incentive e￿ects for low ability students. For
students at the higher end of the skill distribution the threshold is feasible
and positive incentive e￿ects are observed. This ￿nding is consistent with
results reported in Angrist and Lavy (2005) who ￿nd that only the girls in
the upper part of the ability distribution respond to the rewards o￿ered in
their experiment.
Interestingly, while the experiment only rewarded achievement in the
￿rst year, the e￿ects after three years are larger than the e￿ects observed
after one year. The increased negative e￿ect for low ability students could
be readily explained if the aforementioned reduction of intrinsic motivation
is permanent. The increased positive e￿ect for high ability students cannot
be explained by reference to intrinsic motivation. Assuming that for this
group the rewards initially also have adverse e￿ects on intrinsic motivation it
would require that intrinsic motivation not only reappears but is higher than
it would have been in the absence of the ￿nancial reward in the ￿rst year.
One explanation for the increased positive e￿ect for high ability students
is that during the year of the experiment, the high ability students in the
reward groups experienced that working hard resulted in good exam results,
and that this motivated them to continue working hard after the experiment
￿nished.
An alternative explanation for the ampli￿cation of the (negative and
positive) e￿ects is that being on track after the ￿rst year makes studying
in subsequent years easier for at least two reasons. First, making re-take
exams distracts attention from the regular program. Students who have to
do few or no re-take exams can follow the standard program and concen-
trate their attention on fewer courses. Second, students who fail exams may
consequently lack the prerequisite knowledge to successfully complete second
(and third) year courses.
Are the e￿ects on achievement consistent with self-reported e￿ort? The
last two columns of Table 4 report self-reported e￿ort by treatment/ability
interaction. Although none of these e￿ects are signi￿cant, the point estimates
are consistent with the results on achievement: low ability students in the
treatment groups spent less time studying, whereas high ability students in
the treatment groups report that they spent more time on their study. The
fact that we do not ￿nd signi￿cant e￿ects of the rewards on students’ self-
23Table 6: Incidence and size of supplementary rewards
Incidence rate Mean reward size
(1) (2)
Large reward 0.104 e770
Small reward 0.025 e750
Control 0.053 e625
reported e￿ort is likely to be at least partly due to measurement error in the
e￿ort variables. This is also what Kremer et al. (2004) report. They ￿nd
signi￿cantly positive e￿ects of their rewards on observed school attendance,
while the e￿ects of rewards on self-reported measures of e￿ort (and attitudes
towards education) are insigni￿cant.
6 Threats to validity
While a randomized experiment is often considered the gold standard in
research on treatment evaluation (Currie, 2001; Du￿o and Kremer, 2003), it
is not without threats to validity of the outcomes. Heckman et al. (1999)
and Philipson (2000) have drawn attention to the importance of general
equilibrium e￿ects and external treatment e￿ects or spillover e￿ects. In
the context of our experiment three confounding factors may play a role.
First there may be treatment substitution bias. Parents may promise a
reward or supplement the reward if students are assigned to the control or
small reward group. In this case all participants would be confronted with
essentially the same treatment and we would ￿nd no di￿erence between the
original three groups. To investigate whether such responses actually took
place, we included in the post-experiment questionnaire a question whether
someone else (for instance parents) promised a reward for passing all ￿rst
year exams. Table 6 reports for each group the shares of students responding
a￿rmative to this question along with the mean values of the size of these
supplementary rewards. The table shows that supplementary rewards are
fairly uncommon, and that incidence rate and size of such rewards are higher
among the large reward group than among the small reward group and the
control group. Therefore we expect supplementary rewards to have no impact
on our ￿ndings. Note that the negative treatment e￿ect for low ability
students can only be explained by substitution bias if the low ability students
in the control group were promised rewards exceeding the rewards of the
24experiment. Such a pattern is clearly not present in the data.
A second possible confounding factor is that teachers may grade exams
di￿erently for students in the reward groups than for students in the control
groups. Although teachers are in principle unaware of the treatment status
of their students, students could communicate their status in the hope that
teachers will grade their exams more favorably. This seems unlikely for two
reasons. First, students from the control group could also claim that they
belong to a reward group if this implies that their exam will be graded
more favorably. A second and more important reason is that during the
￿rst academic year most exams are multiple-choice tests. Such tests give
teachers little leeway to manipulate grades of particular students, so that it
can neither explain the positive treatment e￿ect for high ability students nor
the negative treatment e￿ects for low ability students.
A ￿nal possible confounding factor is that if the rewards induce students
in the reward groups to work harder, this could spill over to their peers in
the control group. We consider it unlikely that spillover e￿ects in￿uenced
our ￿ndings. The overall pass rate of the students in our experiment, and
in particular the control group, is very similar to the pass rates of previous
cohorts. Information about student e￿ort from previous cohorts is in line
with student e￿ort among the students that participated in the experiment.
There is also no change in the composition of the student population in
terms of secondary school grades for mathematics. To attribute the negative
treatment e￿ect for low ability students together with the positive treatment
e￿ect for high ability to spillovers, it should be the case that low ability
controls bene￿t more from spillovers than high ability controls, which is a
very unlikely scenario.
7 Conclusion
This paper reports about a randomized social experiment that investigated
the e￿ects of ￿nancial incentives on undergraduate students’ achievement.
The target population consists of ￿rst year economics and business students
at the University of Amsterdam. The students, who were randomized into
three reward groups, could earn a reward upon passing all ￿rst year exams
before the start of their second academic year. In the large reward group
the reward was e681 and in the small reward group the reward was e227.
25Students in the control group could not earn a reward.
We ￿nd that the rewards have small and non-signi￿cant e￿ects on the
￿rst year pass rate. There are no e￿ects on the number of achieved credit
points by the end of the ￿rst year. Further breakdown of these results shows
that there is signi￿cant heterogeneity in the behavioral response to these
￿nancial incentives. In particular, high ability students have higher pass
rates and collect signi￿cantly more credit points when assigned to larger
reward groups. Low ability students on the other hand appear to achieve
less when assigned to larger reward groups.
After the ￿rst year these e￿ects are only signi￿cant for the high ability
group, but after three years the size of the e￿ects has increased and is sta-
tistically signi￿cant for both the low and high ability group. The average
treatment e￿ect is therefore small and non-signi￿cant not because the stu-
dents are unresponsive to ￿nancial incentives, but because it is an average
of a positive e￿ect at the upper end of the skill distribution and a negative
e￿ect at the lower end.
One interpretation of our ￿ndings follows Camerer and Hogarth (1999)
and emphasizes the importance of the match between the ability of the sub-
ject (capital), and how e￿ort translates in achievement (production). The
performance threshold tied to the reward can result in a binding participa-
tion constraint (i.e. ceiling e￿ects) at the bottom of the ability distribution.
This will then result in zero incentive e￿ects for low ability students. If,
at the same time, ￿nancial rewards have important displacement e￿ects on
intrinsic motivation this can explain a negative relationship between reward
(size) and achievement for low ability students (for whom the displacement
e￿ect dominates the incentive e￿ect), and a positive relation for high abil-
ity students (where the incentive e￿ect dominates the displacement e￿ect).
This mixing of negative and positive relationships between reward size and
achievement for di￿erent subgroups can generate non-monotonic relation-
ships between reward size and achievement in the population as in Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000).
Due to a relatively small sample, the results reported in this paper are
not very precisely estimated. Yet they are clearly informative about the
signs and the sizes of the e￿ects. Because we study an entire population
we can only increase the sample size by running the same experiment with
new cohorts. The related studies conducted by Angrist and Lavy (2005)
26and Kremer et al. (2004) su￿er from comparable problems with precision of
the estimates. Taken together, however, the three studies reveal a consis-
tent pattern. All three papers indicate that ￿nancial incentives for students
may enhance achievement. Two out of three papers (Angrist and Lavy and
the current paper) moreover report evidence that positive e￿ects are concen-
trated amongst high ability students. Given the disputable e￿ectiveness of
other education interventions it seems that ￿nancial incentives for students
may be a promising alternative that should be explored further.
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31Table A3: Achievement and self-reported e￿ort by ability, No Controls
Achievement, Year 1 Achievement, Year 1-3 Self-reported e￿ort
Pass Credit Credit Drop Hours Hours
Rate Points Points Out p/w Summer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Small Reward -0.196 -7.594 -36.450 0.067 -0.320 -3.179
(0.184) (12.402) (36.257) (0.287) (6.668) (21.099)
Large Reward -0.258 -25.597 -88.896 0.562 -2.343 11.679
(0.202) (13.048) (38.147) (0.287) (7.053) (26.907)
Small Reward * Ability 0.038 1.151 6.194 -0.023 -0.155 -0.667
(0.039) (2.212) (6.468) (0.049) (1.192) (3.537)
Large Reward * Ability 0.057 4.752 16.420 -0.115 0.229 -2.126
(0.042) (2.335) (6.827) (0.048) (1.262) (4.445)
Ability 0.100 5.305 9.382 -0.044 0.455 -1.358
(0.027) (1.509) (4.411) (0.036) (0.838) (2.449)
Intercept -0.351 4.105 32.902 0.644 17.301 36.869
(0.128) (8.549) (24.993) (0.207) (4.717) (14.857)
Pr>|t|
Small Reward 0.287 0.541 0.316 0.816 0.962 0.880
Large Reward 0.202 0.051 0.021 0.052 0.740 0.665
Small Reward * Ability 0.338 0.603 0.339 0.638 0.897 0.851
Large Reward * Ability 0.177 0.043 0.017 0.018 0.856 0.633
Note: Regression estimates with their standard errors in paren-
theses. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust when out-
come variables are binary.
32